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Abstract:
Finance,  power  and  distribution  are  issues  that  are  largely  absent  in  
conventional macroeconomics. This paper outlines the implicit economic process  
embedded  in  the  neo-classical  and  new-Keynesian  constructions  of  
macroeconomics  regarding  the  finance-investment  relation.  It  then  develops  a  
general post-Keynesian framework and argues that finance, power and income  
distribution  are  significant  determinants  of  investment  and  macroeconomic 
activity.
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1. Introduction
Inadequate long-term productive investment to support full employment 
and economic growth has been one of the most significant characteristics of many 
economies  since  the  late  1970’s.  In  addition,  high  unemployment,  severe 
distributional changes, stagnation, financial turbulence and an increasing risk of 
deflation  and crisis  reinforce  voices  that  traditionally  dispute  the  fundamental 
ethical  standard  of  efficiency  through  which  political  economy  evaluates  the 
capitalist system.  A question that deserves analysis is to what extent the weak 
investment  performance  is  related  to  financial  developments  and  high  interest 
rates, which are also symptoms of the economic instability in the post Bretton-
Wood era. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the links between finance, monetary 
policy  and  investment  and  to  enlighten  the  extent  that  poor  investment 
performance could be attributed to monetary and financial factors. In section 2 we 
briefly and critically present the neo-classical and the new-Keynesian perspectives 
of  the  finance-investment  relation,  which  consider  investment  conditional  to 
changes in the cost of capital and to credit rationing. In section 3, we outline a 
general  post-Keynesian  perspective  emphasising  the  importance  of  interest 
payments and firms’ internal finance in investment decisions. In this perspective, 
power,  financial  interests  and  deflationary  monetary  policy  merit  serious 
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responsibility  for  today’s  poor  investment  performance  and  macroeconomic 
instability.  In  section  4  we  use  econometric  techniques  to  test  some  of  our 
hypotheses, using annual data of the USA and the UK for the period 1970-2002. 
Finally, section 5 summarise and concludes the paper. 
2. Finance and Investment in Alternative Macroeconomic Traditions
The  possibility  that  monetary  and  financial  forces  might  influence 
investment  and  the  performance  of  a  capitalist  economy  has  been  frequently 
discussed  and  continues  to  be  an  issue  of  research  in  economic  literature. 
Research interest on finance and investment has been motivated by the following 
three significant reasons: i) a consideration of money and finance as factors that 
might  affect  investment  and  economic  activity  gives  rise  to  more  general 
questions about the relationship between the monetary sector and the "real sector", 
a theme that has dichotomise economic theory; ii) investment affects the state of 
aggregate demand, and through it the output produced and employment. In the 
long-run, capital investment is a significant determinant of labour productivity, 
wage income and economic  prosperity;  iii)  investment  provides  the means by 
which monetary policy might influence the course of business cycle in the short-
run. To the extent that monetary policy influences investment, it will affect the 
capital stock and economic growth in the long-run. Bearing in mind the objective 
of many countries to improve their investment and economic performance, we 
need  a  clear  conception  of  the  mechanism with  which  finance  and  monetary 
policy might affect investment. 1 
2.1. The Neo-classical Macro Process
Neo-classical  macroeconomic  research  presumes  that  financial  markets 
function  smoothly  and firms’  investment  decisions  are  isolated  from financial 
influences. Modigliani and Miller (1958), who worked within the Arrow-Debreu 
economic environment, developed a theorem with which they assume that firms’ 
investment  decisions  are  independent  from their  financial  structure  under  the 
assumption  of  perfect  capital  markets.  The  Modigliani  and  Miller  theorem 
stimulated  the  development  of  the  cost  of  capital  perspective  of  investment 
decisions (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Jorgenson, 1971). 
Neoclassical theoretical and empirical models of investment are heavily 
based on the assumption of a ‘representative firm’ that responds to prices set in 
self-equilibrated and perfectly competitive capital markets. If all firms have equal 
access  to  capital  markets,  then  their  financial  structure  is  irrelevant  to  their 
productive  investment,  because,  as  Fazzari  et  all.  (1988)  have  noted,  external 
funds appear to be a perfect substitute for internal capital. With perfect capital 
markets, firms’ investment decisions and their profit optimisation problem could 
be solved without considering effects of financial factors. 
1 For extensive review papers on the finance-investment relation, see Jorgenson (1971), Gertler  
(1988) and  Chirinko (1993).
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Neoclassical  monetary  theory  falls  within  the  tradition  of  what 
Schumpeter (1954) termed ‘real’ analysis. Representative firms are considered to 
be rational units that make optimal decisions, i.e. employ the quantity of labour 
and capital, which maximise their profits and define their production possibilities. 
The only constraints on firm’s decisions arise from market prices (which they 
cannot  be  affected  by  firms  under  the  assumption  of  perfectly  competitive 
markets) and technology (that determines the amount of output a firm can produce 
from given inputs and at a given price). 
The neo-classical macroeconomic process is marked by a strong causation 
running from labour markets to good markets and in turn to financial markets. The 
economic rationale of this paradigm is as follows (Garegnani, 1978, Nuti, 1971). 
The perfectly competitive labour market determines employment and real wages. 
Labour  demand  depends  upon  the  existing  capital  stock  and  production 
technology,  which  determines  labour  productivity  Labour  supply  depends  on 
household income and preferences over leisure. Investment decisions are affected 
by the state of technology and technological progress as well as the market prices, 
including the interest rate, which determine the cost of capital. Given the level of 
employment and capital, firms’ production technology determines output.  
Given the level of output, interest rate adjustments clear the financial and 
product markets. The interest rate is viewed as being determined by ‘real’ factors 
in the long-run, which are usually summarized under the headings of productivity 
and thrift.  These ‘real’  factors presumably lie behind the demand for,  and the 
supply of, loanable funds. The interest rates equilibrate the demand for real loan 
used  for  financing  consumption  and  investment  with  the  supply  of  saving, 
validating Say’s Law.  Monetary policy affects investment only to the extent that 
it influences the market interest rate in the short-run.  Money influences only the 
price  level.  Financial  market  equilibrium  is  achieved  by  the  price  level 
adjustment, which equilibrates the demand for and supply of real money balances. 
There are no feedback effects among markets. 
The neo-classical link between finance, monetary forces and investment 
lies on the assumptions of rationality, perfect information and perfect competition. 
Under  these  assumptions  and  without  financial  and  information  constraints, 
money  and  finance  do  not  matter  for  the  well  functioning  of  markets.  For 
example, all firms can purchase all the productive factors they want, labour and 
capital, and sell all their output that maximises their profit at given prices. In the 
case  that  firms  do  not  have  sufficient  profits  (internal  funds)  to  finance  their 
investment projects, they can borrow all the funds they need externally, from the 
credit market. There is not any thrift of time inconsistency in credit market, which 
could interrupt the exchange process. Uncertainty and risk do not exist. Power and 
income  distribution  are  absent.  Labour  markets  are  characterised  by  perfect 
competition, which means that both labour and firms have no power. If workers 
are given power through trade unions, there is not any change in the good and 
financial markets. Powerful unions give rise to higher wages and lower output and 
employment.  All  households  have  the  same  marginal  propensity  to  consume, 
independent  of  their  level  of  income,  and  hence  the  distribution  of  income 
between profits and wages does not matter. 
Concluding, the perfectly competitive environment and the absence of any 
type  of  financial  constraints  described  by  the  neoclassical  perspective  do  not 
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adequately  analyse  the  economic  and  financial  conditions  that  firms  and  in 
general the industrial sector face in all economies. In real world, industrial firms 
have some control over the price they charge in product markets, while financial 
institutions and banks have control over the price and the availability of finance. 
The use of this set of assumptions and of the analytical apparatus of permanently 
self-equilibrated markets ensures internal stability in any market and in the whole 
economy. However,  the assumptions of perfect capital  markets  and financially 
unconstrained firms are by no means undisputed. It is doubted to what extent they 
reflect economic reality and in particular the functioning of credit markets. The 
weak empirical success of the neoclassical theory of investment (Chirinko, 1993; 
Fazzari  1993;  Fazzari  and  Mott,  1986-87;  Fazzari  et  all.,  1988)  gives  rise  to 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of policies that have implemented on the basis 
of the neoclassical channel of influence on investment. 
2.2. The New-Keynesian Macro Process
New theoretical and empirical research has made important advances in 
studying what are often called external  financial  constraints.  The idea that the 
access to finance may pose a constraint on investment, independent of traditional 
determinants such as interest  rates, taxes, and technology, goes back at last to 
Marshall (1924), Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1937a; 1937b).
New-Keynesian economists have worked out sophisticated models in an 
attempt  to  construct  the  micro  foundations  of  the  effects  of  external  finance 
failures in investment decisions. In these models, credit rationing is the result of 
the existence of uncertainty (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987; 1988). In a market 
economy, uncertainty, conditional to human inability to eliminate it in the context 
of probability, arises due to informational asymmetries among the participants in 
the markets. Despite the assumption made in these models that economic agents 
are rational and have perfect knowledge and computational capacity to elaborate 
the available information, they cannot form perfect expectations in order to make 
accurate predictions about changes in market prices, due to the fact that they do 
not have perfect information. The price mechanism does not operate efficiently to 
clear the markets, not because of institutional rigidities, but due to informational 
asymmetries (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1989)2. 
More  specifically,  new-Keynesian  models  consider  how  imperfect 
information  between  two  traders  can  cause  a  malfunction  within  the  capital 
market.  An early  example  in  this  tradition is  the  paper  written by  Jaffee  and 
Russell (1976), who explain credit rationing because of imperfect information on 
a borrower's quality. Lenders do not have perfect information about the quality of 
2 The informational asymmetries and imperfect markets are two of the basic differences between  
the new-Keynesian tradition and the new-classical tradition. New-classical models assume that  
economic agents are rational and have perfect information and perfect knowledge. Under these  
assumptions  the  price  mechanism  can  operate  efficiently  and  clears  the  markets,  because  
economic agents can accurately predict changes in prices in the future. However, the relaxing of  
the  assumption  of  perfect  information  generates  market  imperfections.  In  the  neo-classical  
tradition market imperfections result from institutional rigidities in markets.
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the borrower and therefore, they cannot estimate the default probabilities among 
different  borrowers.  Since  borrowers  are  indistinguishable,  lenders  charge  a 
higher rate of interest, which incorporate a lemon's premium. Jaffee and Russell 
(1976) observed that the high rate of interest harms the economic interest of the 
good  quality  borrowers.  In  their  view,  credit-rationing  results  when  good 
borrowers prefer the loan restrictions because the smaller loan sizes may reduce 
the market average default probability reducing the lemon's premium and the rate 
of interest. An interesting point in their work is that borrowers and lenders appear 
to have power to change the rate of interest. 
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss have developed various models of credit 
rationing. Starting with an initial allocation of information, the main assumption 
made  is  that  banks  select  the  rate  of  interest,  which  maximises  their  profits 
regardless  of  whether  this  rate  of  interest  is  the  equilibrium rate  (Stiglitz  and 
Weiss, 1981). It is assumed that at this level of interest, the demand for credit is 
very likely to be greater than the supply of credit. This excess demand results not 
because of a change in the rate of interest, but due to credit rationing from banks. 
The rationale behind this assertion is that, there are loan applicants who appear to 
be identical  with them who have received a loan,  but they have been rejected 
unless they offered to pay a higher interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Stiglitz, 
1988; 1992). This happens due to the fact that there are moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems in the decision- making of the banking sector. The adverse 
selection  problem  is  related  to  the  existence  of  various  borrowers  who  have 
different probabilities of repaying their loan. The profits of banks depend on the 
probability of repayment, so that banks wish to identify borrowers who are more 
likely to repay and to make optimal decisions, which maximise their profits in an 
uncertain environment (Greenwald and Stiglitz,  1993).  The borrowers who are 
willing to  pay high interest  rate  may on average  have a  higher  probability  of 
default, something that increases the risk of repayment for banks. Thus, a rise in 
the rate of interest will increase the average probability of default of those who 
have  borrowed  money,  increasing  the  risk  of  the  banks  to  make  loss. 
Consequently, the rate of interest is considered to be a screening device among 
risk borrowers. The reason is that, informational asymmetries and moral hazard 
problems make banks unable to control the economic actions of the borrowers. 
Thus the banking sector selects the rate of interest, which maximises the profit of 
the sector unless it  causes credit  rationing. Blinder (1987) observes that credit 
rationing is the operative mechanism, which transmits any monetary shock to the 
product and labour market. 
The question emerges is about the way with which credit rationing affects 
the product  and  labour  markets  and  economic  activity.  When firms expect  to 
make profits, they increase their demand for credit from the banking system to 
finance new investment. Initially banks accommodate the increasing demand for 
credit and supply the necessary credit to meet the demand. As long as economic 
activity expands, credit expansion fuels because of a credit multiplier, which leads 
to more investment in the business sector, more output and employment, as well 
as, more bank deposits and credit. The expansion of the economic activity is an 
inflationary process. As prices rise, the real available credit falls. Firms increase 
their demand for credit, which, however, cannot be met because of banks' policy 
to ration credit. In such a case, the business sector finds itself with limited external 
76 European Research Studies, Volume XI, Issue (1-2) 2008
financial resources and unable to undertake new investment. A fall in investment 
will reduce the aggregate demand and the expected business profits making the 
investors unwilling to borrow money. In this manner credit  rationing causes a 
failure of aggregate supply and employment. 
Myers  and  Majluf  (1984),  Greenwald,  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1984)  and 
Stiglitz  (1992)  have  developed  equity  rationing  models  analogous  to  credit 
rationing models. Equity rationing results when firms cannot raise external capital 
in equity markets. Imperfect information in equity markets generates moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. An adverse selection problem takes place when 
the decision makers of firms (managers) have superior information from potential 
equity buyers. A decision to sell new equity indicates that, on average, the view of 
the manager of a firm is less optimistic compared to the new of the participants in 
equity markets. The announcement of issue new equity is very likely to cause a 
downward revaluation of the firm in the market, which in its turn will decrease the 
demand  for  firm's  equities.  Asymmetric  information  in  equity  markets  is  the 
reason therefore, which causes equity rationing and limits the choices of a firm to 
raise  external  funds in  order  to finance new investments.  Credit  rationing and 
equity rationing form the basis of a finance rationing, which reflects the failure of 
the capital markets and the failure of a market economy according to the new-
Keynesians.
Capitalism is a monetary economy, and hence moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems form an uncertain structure of micro economic transactions 
influencing any process of decision-making. Uncertainty causes instability in the 
macroeconomic policy decision-making, because it makes the participants in the 
markets unsafe about their economic interests. Economic agents act on the basis 
of their economic interests and attempt to influence the policy-making in a way 
with which to maximise their economic benefits conditional to the information 
they  have  in  an  uncertain  and  risky  economic  environment.  However,  the 
economic  interests  of  lenders  and  borrowers  are  not  considered  to  be  a 
fundamental determinant of their economic and political behaviour in the new-
Keynesian macroeconomics. In this tradition the targets of the monetary policy 
are analysed on the basis of the informational asymmetries among the participants 
in the market without considering their power and economic interests and the way 
they are influence the monetary policy-making. Credit rationing models implicitly 
refer to the conflict of the economic interests between the banking sector and the 
business sector. However, this conflict is limited to the informational asymmetries 
ignoring distributional conflicts. 
 
3. A General Post-Keynesian-Kaleckian Macroeconomic Process 
Power  and  conflict  might  play  a  significant  role  in  banks  and  other 
financial institutions ability to influence the price and the availability of finance. 
The  concept  of  power  raises  questions  about  its  distribution  among  different 
social groups and sections, i.e. the business sector, the banking sector and must be 
considered  conditional  to  the  institutional  structure  of  an  economy.  The 
connection between the industrial and the financial sector is a factor that to a large 
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extent forms the type of the relationship between the two sectors, whether it is 
cooperative  or  conflictual  (Argitis,  2001).  The  institutional  structure  of  an 
economy is  therefore  important  in  considerations  regarding  the  availability  of 
external finance from banks to industry and in the interest  rate setting.  Credit 
rationing  is  thus  more  probable  in  a  conflictual  institutional  structure.  The 
investigation of the role of such institutional, political and power factors in the 
way that finance and monetary policy might affect investment and accumulation 
is  very  important,  since  it  accounts  for  national  diversities  in  economic 
performance.  We will  attempt to theoretically outline the role  of  these factors 
within a general post-Keynesian framework. 
The  thrust  of  post-Keynesian  macroeconomics  is  the  centrality  of 
aggregate  demand in the determination of  the level  of economic activity.  The 
aggregate  consumption  function  incorporated  a  Kaleckian  difference  in  the 
propensity  to  consume  out  of  wage  and  profit  income  allows  distribution  to 
impact  the  level  of  aggregate  demand.  Power  is  considered  to  be  crucial  in 
defining  the  way  income  is  distributed.  On  the  other  hand,  investment  is  a 
function of the rate of capacity utilisation (Marglin and Bhauri, 1991) and firm’s 
internal funds (Fazzari, 1993), which in turn depends on total profit realised. A 
fall  in  expected  total  profit  and  in  expected  internal  funds  generates  finance 
constraints on investment spending.  To understand these macro relations we shall 
first consider the role of debt in an economy with a conflictual relation between 
the industrial and the financial sectors. 
Debt  is  a  central  financial  feature of  post-Keynesian macro-economics, 
and is conceptualised as a factor that influence investment and aggregate demand. 
Debt creates a complex set of relations between the industrial and the financial 
sector. The focus on debt derives from the seminal work developed by Minsky on 
financial instability and crisis. Minsky’s central concern has been to develop an 
endogenous process of macro-instability. In his argumentation, systemic financial 
fragility  and  instability  arise  from the  financial  practices  of  the  non-financial 
corporate sector.  His inspiration is derived from Keynes's  General Theory and 
Fisher's description of a debt deflation (Minsky, 1974). 
According to Minsky (1977; 1982a; 1982b; 1986; 1992), the robustness or 
fragility of a financial system depends on two relations: the cash flow patterns of a 
financial system, and the way the functioning of a financial system affects the 
cash flow, which enable business, households and financial institutions to fulfil 
their financial commitments. The two sectors appear to have competing interests 
and both want to maximize their profits. Industry makes profit through investment 
and the accumulation process, while banks and other financial institutions through 
lending and other financial activities. 
More specifically, in Minsky’s approach macroeconomic instability cause 
by financial instability. The latter regards an initial robust financial system, which 
is transformed to a fragile financial  system. Financial  instability and crisis  are 
very likely to occur as a result of an increasing fragility in the financial sector.3 
There are three fundamental determinants of this happening; when the corporate 
sector increases its reliance on debt to finance new investment; when economy’s 
3 This is the case when some financial units can not refinance their position through the normal  
channels (credit markets) and are forced to raise cash by unconventional instruments or by trying  
to sell out their position to increase their liquidity (Minsky, 1986).
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liquidity falls and when finance becomes more speculative and  ponzi (Minsky, 
1977)4. 
In case that the business sector finds profitable investment opportunities, 
especially during the economic upswing, demands more credit. The accumulation 
of debt increases the fragility of the corporate sector. At the peak of the business 
cycle, the demand for credit  from the corporate sector is inelastic, but, on the 
other hand, the supply of credit is not perfectly elastic. The increasing demand for 
credit increases the power of the financial system, which influences the politics of 
the central bank and pushes the rate of interest up. As a result, the cash payment 
commitments of the corporate sector will  increase relative to its  cash receipts, 
while, simultaneously, the market value of the firm's assets will fall relative to its 
liabilities. 
Minsky follows Kalecki and argues that corporate profits are determined 
by capitalist investment. On the other hand, Kalecki’s (1971) argues the amount 
of capital owned by the firm, is of decisive importance in limiting investment and 
the size of a firm. Kalecki makes a distinction between the capital owned by the 
firm and the capital it tries to borrow. What is crucial in Kalecki’s argument is the 
idea that a firm’s access to the capital market is determined, among other factors, 
by  the  amount  of  its  own  capital.  In  other  words,  the  external  finance  that 
industrial firms hope to obtain in the form of lending is determined by the amount 
of their  internal finance.  A firms’ ability to grow thus depends directly on its 
internal finance generate by realised profits and indirectly through borrowing that 
depends on its internal finance.  
In  this  framework,  a  tight  monetary policy  exerts  a  negative  effect  on 
investment  and  accumulation  via  two  channels.  First,  it  increases  interest 
payments paid by the industrial  sector and hence causes a distributional effect 
worsening the ratio of internal/external finance for the corporate sector, which 
increase  its  reliance  on  debt.  Yet,  investment  decisions  depend  on  a  more 
expensive external finance. Secondly, in a Kaleckian manner, the availability of 
external finance to business sector falls because of the decrease in its  internal 
funds. Consequently, investment is very likely to decrease. In this perspective, the 
interest  rate  does  not  work through the cost  of  capital  effect,  but  through the 
distributional effect. A fall in investment reduces business profits and makes firms 
4 According to Minsky (1977), in a modern capitalist economy economic units control a structure  
of  capital  assets  that  yield  cash  flows  over  time,  which  depends  on  the  demand  for  output  
produced  by  these  capital  assets  and  the  output  price.  Combinations  of  debt  and  equity  
constructing a structure of firm’s liabilities and firm’s gross profits finance such capital assets. At  
any point  in time the liability structure determines a  time series  of  payments.  The cash flow  
problem for a unit concerns the balancing between the cash receipts from operations and the cash  
payments due to debts. If the expected cash receipts exceed the cash payment commitments during  
a period of time, then, a unit is a hedge unit. If the unit can meet the payment commitments on 
liabilities,  which  represent  only interest,  but  not  all  its  payment  commitments  over  the  same  
period, is a speculative financing unit. A ponzi financing unit is a speculative unit for which the 
interest of its payment commitments exceeds the net income receipts. The continuation of the  
functioning of a  ponzi financing unit depends on its ability to borrow money. Both  ponzi and 
speculative units are vulnerable to changes in the financial markets and changes in the rate of  
interest. Financial constraints and higher interest rates raises the fragility of the financial system 
and lead ponzi and speculative units to bankruptcy.
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unable to meet their interest payments for their debt generating possibilities of 
financial instability and crisis. Financial instability is transforming to the business 
sector.  The  stance  of  the  monetary  policy  appears,  therefore,  to  be  a  crucial 
determinant  of  the  finance-investment  relation  and the  macro-behaviour  of  an 
economy. Minsky in all his work strongly proposes that the central bank must act 
as a lender of last resort; to implement expansionary policies in order to relax 
tensions in financial markets and to avoid a financial and macro instability.
Business profits are also affected by the distribution of income between 
entrepreneurs  and  workers.  Income  redistribution  at  the  expense  of  workers 
minimise the distributional effects of monetary policy and increases the internal 
finance  for  the  business  sector.  However,  such  a  change  is  likely  to  have  a 
negative demand effect. 
Concluding, this general post-Keynesian perspective considers power and 
conflict in the investigation of the finance-investment relation. Finance is allowed 
to  be  factor  that  influences  the  politics  of  the  central  bank and the  monetary 
policy-making. High interest rates increase the interest payments paid by industry 
and  reduce  the  available  internal  funds  for  the  business  sector  to  finance 
investment.  This  type  of  finance-investment  relation presupposes  a  conflicting 
relation  between  the  industrial  and  the  financial  system.  Only  in  such  an 
institutional structure finance is likely to cause distributional and demand effects 
and macro-instability. This is the case of the economic structures of the UK and 
the  USA.  The  post-Keynesian  perspective,  in  contradistinction  with  the  neo-
classical  and  the  new-Keynesian,  allows  for  the  multiplicity  of  capitalist 
institutions, structures and practices in today's world.
 
4. Empirical Analysis
The last two decades or so, the globalisation of finance has lead to the 
creation of a new macroeconomic policy-structure.  Unprecedented high interest 
rates and a deflationary obsession in macro-policy have been major features of 
developed and developing countries. In this section we use the post-Keynesian 
perspective developed previously and attempt to investigate whether these policy 
changes  have  influenced  the  financial  structure  of  firms,  their  investment 
decision-making and the macro-systems of nations.   
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit the way changes in data patterns have occurred 
concerning real interest payments paid by non-financial corporations (NFCS) in 
the USA and the UK during the period 1963-2002. We observe an upward trend 
of real interest payments since the late 1970’s, which became sharper during the 
1980s,  when  high  real  interest  rates  consolidated.  After  1991  real  interest 
payments show a downward movement, but from the mid-1990s this trend has 
been reversed. However  the interest paid by the NFCS is very much above the 
level reached in the 1960's and 1970's. 
Figures 3 and 4 exhibit the real interest payments as a percentage of the 
total  business  profit.  This  ration  also  reveals  changes  in  the  internal  funds 
available to the business sector to finance investment plans. We observe that in 
the USA there is an internal finance squeeze up to the 1990. During the 1990s the 
business sector achieved to reduce its interest payments and to recover internal 
profits, however this developed reversed in the second half of the 1990s. In the 
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UK the non-financial corporate sector has experienced less severe reductions in its 
available internal funds. There is an upward trend in the interest payments, which 
reveals  that  internal  funds  have  been  under  a  systematic  pressure  due  to  the 
redistribution effects  of  the  accumulated debt  and the  deflationary bias  of  the 
monetary  policy.  But  to  what  extent  these  financial  developments  influence 
investment expenditures?       
4.1. An Econometric Investigation 
The  investment  function  has  been  the  subject  of  a  large  number  of 
econometric  studies,  which  have  provided  very  important  evidence  with 
significant  implications  for  theory  and  policy.  In  this  paper  we  develop  an 
investment equation, inspired by the post-Keynesian perspective, in an attempt to 
empirically  assess  new  channels  through  which  finance  might  influence 
investment. 
Equation 1 formalizes our main hypotheses: 
GCS = f(FINPS, CU, WSS)    (1)                        
The growth rate of business capital stock, GCS, is our dependent variable. The 
expansion of the capital stock captures both the materialization of new investment 
and the dynamics of the investment decision-making.  The variable FINPS, is the 
interest payments as a percentage of total business profit. We select this variable 
because it reflects the distributional impact of finance and of monetary policy on 
business internal funds. The idea lies on the Minskian negative relation between 
cash  payments  and  investment.  A  rise  in  the  financial  profit  share  normally 
reflects higher interest payments and less available internal funds5 for firms to 
finance new investment as well as pessimistic expectations about future profits 
and profitability. Furthermore, this variable also captures the politics of the central 
bank and the distributional impacts of the stance of monetary policy.   
Within  a  post-Keynesian  framework,  investment  is  also  affected  by 
changes in aggregate demand. The standard accelerator hypothesis underpins this 
relation. The best way of incorporating this effect into an empirical investment 
equation would be to include a capacity utilisation variable,  as a proxy of the 
aggregate  demand.  This  variable  has  been  extensively  used  in  many 
econometrically estimated investment models. 
Our last explanatory variable is the labour income share, WSS. According 
to the post-Keynesian perspective developed previously, an increase in business 
profit share reduces the negative distributional effect of finance on internal funds. 
Industry  by  redistributing  wage  income  counterbalance  the  rise  in  interest 
payments paid to the financial sector. We use the WSS to capture this effect and 
to avoid misspecification problems in our econometric model raised by correlated 
5 The issue of the causation between internal funds and investment has been addressed by other  
empirical works (e.g. Fazzari and Mott, 1986-87; Fazzari et all., 1988; Fazzari, 1993; van Ees et  
al., 1997).
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variables. Furthermore, the use of the WSS variable allows to capture the impact 
that workers’ power might have on wage-setting and on income distribution.      
Assuming  a  linear  function  and  a  stochastic  relationship,  equation  1 
including the error term results in the following specification of our estimating 
equation:
GCSt = a + bFINPSt + cCUt + dWSSt + ut    (2)
The expected signs being: fFINPS<0; fCU>0; fWSS<0
Full definitions and sources of all the variables are given in the Appendix. 
Note that in our specification many variables are defined in growth rates (GCS) or 
ratios (FINPS,  WSS) and hence are  non-trended.  An investigation of  the  data 
pattern shows that CU is also a non-trended variable. Following the literature, an 
autoregressive  distributed  lag  (ARDL)  structure  of  equation  2  is  tested  using 
annual data.6 We abstain from including other country specific variables and we 
examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in the time series specification. 
The Akaike Information  and the  Schwarz  Bayesian  criteria  suggest  that  a  lag 
structure of the model up to the second order is preferred by the Data. 
Regression results
We regard the ARDL (2,2,2,2,2) model as a starting point and attempt to 
optimise the fit for each country by narrowing down the number of parameters, 
taking the t-value as an indicator. The information we wish to extract from the 
ARDL model is whether the variables should be included in levels, in differences 
and in lags. Table 1 presents the estimated regressions preferred by the data. 
After  the  application  of  a  full  range  of  misspecification  tests  in  the 
estimated regression,  which are  reported in  Table 2,  we fail  to reject  the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, there is no evidence of serial correlation, or of a rejection 
of the linearity, normality, homoskedasticity assumptions at the 5% and 10% level 
of significance by the standard Langrage Multiplier test. Moreover, the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ tests provide no evidence of structural instability in any of the 
reported regressions. The coefficient of determination, R2,  which is .87 for the 
USA indicates a good fitness of our estimated regressions. The insignificance of 
CU in the UK reduces the value of R2 to .59.
The estimates reveal that the first lagged value of the dependent variable 
has a positive and significant influence on the current value of the growth arte of 
capital stock. The statistical significance of the lagged dependent variable shows 
the autoregressive nature of investment. The financial profit share appeared to be 
an important determinant of investment. The results show that in both countries it 
is statistically significant at the 5% level and has the expected negative sign. An 
increase in the interest payments reduces the internal funds for the business sector 
and discourages investment. The share of financial profits to total profits emerges 
therefore,  as  a  channel  through  which  finance  and  monetary  policy  affects 
investment and industrial accumulation. Durable changes in the interest rate and 
6 ARDL models have been shown to have desirable properties even in the face of unit roots 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1995).
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the implementation  of  a  restrictive  monetary  policy  act  as  a  potent  source  of 
internal  financial  constraints  on  investment.  The  opposite  distributional  and 
financial effects will occur if monetary policy is expansionary. 
Turning to the other explanatory variables,  we see that the coefficients 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant, but the CU in the UK. The 
change of capacity utilization appears to exert a significant positive impact on the 
growth rate of capital stock. Macro-policies that stimulate demand will  have a 
strong,  positive  impact  on  investment.  Income  redistribution  towards  workers 
exerts a negative impact on investment as it  is expected.  This variable,  to the 
extent that it captures class power, reveals that shifts in the distribution of power 
are  a  determinant  of  investment  decisions.  Changes  in  the  cost  of  labour 
influences negatively investment decisions. 
5. Conclusions
The results presented here demonstrate that finance, demand and income 
distribution  influences  investment.  Lower  business  profits  and  higher  interest 
payments reduce internal cash flows and thus weaken investment.  In addition, 
lower sales reduce the need to expand industry’s capacity. 
The indebted  firms  and industries  are  likely  that  first  meet  investment 
problems,  when  monetary  policy  becomes  more  restrictive.  The  distributional 
consequences  of  monetary  policy  and  external  financial  bottlenecks  stimulate 
changes in the production process and in firms’ ability to fulfil their repayment 
commitments and thus increase the possibility of a Minskian financial instability 
and crisis. If we really wish a productive investment recovery, more employment, 
macroeconomic and financial stability, it is necessary that an immediate change in 
macroeconomic policies must take place towards an expansionary policy regime. 
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Appendix
Data: Definitions and Sources
FIPS  =  GTP-INP/GTP:  GTP=  Gross  Trading  Profits  of  the  non-financial 
corporate sector before providing for depreciation and stock appreciation, and 
before  taxes,  INP=  Interest  Payments,  Survey  of  Current  Business,  US 
Department of Commerce (USA), Blue Book, National Accounts (UK). 
WS=Wages paid by the non-financial corporate sector. Source the same as above. 
    WSS=WS/WS+GTP.
CU= Capacity Utilization, Main Economic Indicators, OECD. 
GCS= Business Capital Stock, OECD, National Accounts.
Table 1 Regression Results
Period Country
1970-02 USA GCS=-.033 +.66GCS(-1)-.0006FIPS+.0028DCU-.004WSS
R2=.87    -3.4 6.9    -2.58   4.78      -3.38
1970-02 UK GCS=.43+.40GCS(-1)-.29FIPS-.37WSS
R2=.59     2.15 2.08 - 2.34 -2.12               
    Notes: Italic numbers are t-values 
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    Table 2. Diagnostic Tests
Test Statistics LM Version
USA UK
Serial Correlation CHI-SQ(1)=.39 CHI-SQ(1)=1.36
Functional Form CHI-SQ(1)=.062 CHI-SQ(1)=3.89
Normality CHI-SQ(2)=.21 CHI-SQ(2)=2.13
Heteroscedasticity CHI-SQ(1)=.34 CHI-SQ(1)=2.69
   Notes: Critical values for CHI-SQ (1) and CHI-SQ (2) at 5% and CHI-SQ (1)
     at 1% level of significance are 3.84, 5.99 and 6.63 respectively.
 
Figure 1. Real Interest Payments, NFCS, USA
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Figure 2. Real Interest Payments, NFCS, UK
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Figure 3. Real Interes t Paym ents  as  a % of Total Bus ines s  Profit , 
NFCS, USA
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Figure 4. Real Interest Payments as  % of Total Business Profit, NFCS, UK
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